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Note 
FDA Goes Loko with Warning Letters 
Rebecca Boxhorn* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On November 17, 2010, the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) issued a Warning Letter to Phusion 
Projects, makers of the recently popular Four Loko malt liquor 
beverage.1 The FDA issued this letter in the wake of several 
news reports detailing the potentially deadly side effects of 
drinking the beverage—stemming from its extremely high 
caffeine content.2 Four Loko, also known as “black-out in-a-
© 2011 Rebecca Boxhorn. 
* J.D. Candidate 2012, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. Boston 
University.  The author would like to thank Professor Ralph Hall for his 
indispensible help in the execution of this Note, the staff and editors of MJLST 
for their valuable feedback, and her friends and family for their unwavering 
support. 
 1. Letter from Joann M. Givens, Acting Dir., Office of Compliance, Ctr. 
for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, to Jaisen Freeman, Chris Hunter & 
Jeff Wright, Phusion Projects, LLC (Nov. 17, 2010) [hereinafter Letter from 
Joann M. Givens], available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/ucm234023.ht
m. 
 2. See, e.g., Dash Harris, “Black-out in a Can”?, AM. MORNING (Oct. 26, 
2010, 8:17 AM), http://amfix.blogs.cnn.com/2010/10/26/black-out-in-a-
can/?iref=allsearch (“Nine Central Washington University students 
hospitalized this month after an off-campus party were sickened by ‘Four 
Loko,’ a caffeinated malt liquor also known as ‘blackout in a can’ . . . .”); Collin 
Keefe, Hallucinogenic Frenzies and Hospitalized College Kids: Four Loko 
Hysteria Reaches a Fevered Pitch, N.Y. MAG. (Nov. 12, 2010, 11:39 AM), 
http://philadelphia.grubstreet.com/2010/11/hallucinogenic_frenzies_and_ho.ht
ml (“Four Loko, the sickly fruity-sweet malt-based elixir that packs a two-
fisted punch of absurd amounts of caffeine and alcohol, is perhaps the greatest 
scourge to society since communism, or maybe crack cocaine.”); Lance Murray, 
Report: Alcoholic Energy Drink Tied to Fatal Denton Crash, CRIME TIME (Nov. 
16, 2010, 7:55 AM), http://blogs.star-telegram.com/crime_time/2010/11/report-
alcholic-energy-drink-linked-to-fatal-denton-crash.html (“Four Loko has been 
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can,” causes drinkers to be less aware of the side effects of 
alcohol—leading to increased consumption and dehydration.3 
The FDA informed Phusion Projects that the inclusion of 
caffeine in the alcoholic beverage was not generally recognized 
as safe and that caffeine was an unsafe food additive.4 As a 
result, under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
(FDCA), Four Loko was an “adulterated” drink illegal to 
distribute or sell.5 
The FDA’s letter to Phusion Products is one of hundreds of 
similar letters that the FDA sends each year.6 These Warning 
Letters generally contain: (1) a determination that the 
regulated party is in violation of the FDCA, (2) a demand for 
corrective action, (3) a request for response within fifteen days, 
and (4) a warning that the receipt of a Warning Letter may 
hinder future government contracting opportunities.7 The FDA 
classifies Warning Letters as “informal enforcement actions” 
intended to obtain voluntary compliance in lieu of a formal 
enforcement action.8 Warning Letters are an effective method 
implicated in the crash early Sunday morning that killed a 14-year-old girl in 
Denton.”). 
 3. Aina Hunter, Four Loko: Is New Party Brew “Liquid Cocaine?”, CBS 
NEWS HEALTH WATCH (June 17, 2010), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/06/17/health/main6592444.shtml. 
 4. “Generally recognized as safe” or GRAS is a term applied by the FDA 
to food additives that are “generally recognized, among qualified experts, as 
having been adequately shown to be safe under the conditions of its intended 
use . . . .” Generally Recognized as Safe (GRAS), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodIngredientsPackaging/GenerallyRecognizedasSa
feGRAS/default.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2010). See also 21 C.F.R. § 170.3 
(2010). 
 5. Letter from Joann M. Givens, supra note 1. 
 6. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., THE ENFORCEMENT STORY ch. 10, at 10-9 
(2009) [hereinafter ENFORCEMENT STORY]. Warning Letter totals include both 
district and federal offices. 
 7. See, e.g., Letter from Diana Amador-Toro, Dist. Dir., N.J. Dist. Office, 
to Mark Bowden, Vice President of Global Regulatory Affairs, Johnson and 
Johnson Consumer Prods., Inc. (Sept. 27, 2010) [hereinafter Letter from Diana 
Amador-Toro] , available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/ucm227362.ht
m (“Listerine Total Anticavity mouthwash is not generally recognized as safe 
and effective for the antiplaque indications in its labeling, and it is, therefore, 
a new drug under 201(P) of the Act (21 U.S.C. § 321(P)).”). 
 8. State Enforcement Provisions of the Nutrition Labeling and Education 
Act of 1990, 58 Fed. Reg. 2457 (Jan. 6, 1993) [hereinafter State Enforcement 
Regulation]; Warning Letters; Regulatory Procedures Manual, Chapter 8-10; 
Availability, 56 Fed. Reg. 27,026 (June 7, 1991) [hereinafter Warning Letters 
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for coercing recipients to comply with FDA regulations without 
resorting to the cost and time commitment of a formal 
proceeding.9 Many regulated parties, including Phusion 
Projects, change their behavior before the FDA seeks formal 
enforcement.10 Indeed, only one day after receiving a Warning 
Letter from the FDA, Phusion Projects announced that it would 
be removing all caffeine from its products, thus effectively 
responding to the FDA’s purported violations.11 
There are few available options, however, for those 
regulated parties that do not wish to voluntarily comply with 
an FDA Warning Letter. The only courses of action available 
are to defy the FDA and await a potential formal enforcement 
action or to challenge the Warning Letter itself.12 Those parties 
that attempt to challenge FDA Warning Letters face a nearly 
impossible task. The FDA and most courts will not interpret 
FDA Warning Letters as a final agency action and are thus not 
ripe for review before a court.13 Even if considered final agency 
action, regulated parties may not be able to assert standing for 
failure to exhaust all available administrative options.14 While 
the FDA considers Warning Letters to be “informal 
enforcement actions,” very real consequences flow from their 
receipt.15 Beyond the threat of a more “formal” enforcement 
action, regulated parties may lose governmental contracting 
rights, lose investments and sales, and be sued by consumers.16 
Regulation]. 
 9. State Enforcement Regulation, supra note 8, at 2457. 
 10. M. Amedeo Tumolillo, Company to Drop Caffeine From Its Alcoholic 
Drinks, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2010, at A22, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/17/us/17drink.html?_r=1&emc=eta1; Press 
Release, Phusion Projects, Phusion Projects to Remove Caffeine, Guarana and 
Taurine from Products, (Nov. 16, 2010) [hereinafter Phusion Press Release], 
available at http://www.phusionprojects.com/media_reformulation.html; see 
also ENFORCEMENT STORY, supra note 6, ch. 10, at 10-9. 
 11. Phusion Press Release, supra note 10. 
 12. Wash. Legal Found. v. Kessler, 880 F. Supp. 26, 36 (D.D.C. 1995). 
 13. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL ch. 4, 
at 4-13 (2010) [hereinafter PROCEDURES MANUAL]; Cody Labs., Inc. v. 
Sebelius, No. 10-CV-00147-ABJ, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80118, at *33–34 (D. 
Wyo. July 26, 2010). 
 14. See, e.g., Cody Labs, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80118, at *30. 
 15. State Enforcement Regulation, supra note 8, at 2457; Warning Letters 
Regulation, supra note 8, at 27,026. 
 16. See e.g., Letter from Diana Amador-Toro, supra note 7 (explaining 
that other government agencies will be alerted of the company’s receipt of an 
FDA Warning Letter to consider in future contracting opportunities);Val 
Brickates Kennedy, Boston Scientific Slides on FDA Fears, MARKET WATCH 
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These consequences flow from an “informal enforcement action” 
which remains unreviewable by courts under current case 
law.17 
This Note will examine the finality of FDA Warning 
Letters and refute the current case law that denies their 
justiciability. Part II will explain Warning Letters and their 
context in FDA enforcement actions as well as examine the 
current case law addressing the finality of these letters. Part 
III will analyze the current case law and examine Warning 
Letters under applicable finality standards established by the 
Supreme Court. Finally, this Note will conclude that, while 
Warning Letters serve legitimate public health and policy 
interests, judicial review of Warning Letters must be allowed to 
protect regulated parties from agency coercion and potential 
misapplications of the law. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. A REVIEW OF WARNING LETTERS AND FDA ENFORCEMENT 
ACTIONS 
Warning Letters are one of the many administrative tools 
that the FDA uses to address violations of federal law.18 
Warning Letters are correspondence sent by the FDA to firms 
or individuals that the Agency believes to be in violation of the 
FDCA.19 The FDA classifies Warning Letters as “informal 
enforcement actions” as opposed to “formal enforcement 
actions” such as seizures or injunctions.20 Warning Letters 
(Jan. 27, 2006, 5:58 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/boston-scientific-
falls-on-fda-warning-guidant-results (demonstrating the economic 
consequences of receiving a FDA Warning Letter); Yaz FDA Warning, BRANDI 
LAW FIRM, http://www.brandilaw.com/practiceAreas/YAZ-Yasmin-Ocella-FDA-
warning-letter.asp (last visited Mar. 14, 2011) (soliciting law suits to sue Yaz 
after they received an FDA Warning Letter);   One example of an FDA 
Warning Letter having a particularly negative impact on a company is the 
Warning Letter that Vioxx received from the FDA. See Jennifer L. Bragg & 
Melanie Gross, Warning Letters: Strategies for Responding and their Impact in 
the Marketplace, HEALTH CARE CONFERENCE ADMINISTRATORS, 22–23, 
http://www.ehcca.com/presentations/devicecongress2/bragg.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 16, 2011). 
 17. State Enforcement Regulation, supra note 8, at 2457; Warning Letters 
Regulation, supra note 8, at 27,026. 
 18. PETER HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW 1339 (3d ed. 2007). 
 19. Id. 
 20. State Enforcement Regulation, supra note 8, at 2457; Warning Letters 
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“give individuals and firms an opportunity to take voluntary 
and prompt corrective action before [the FDA] initiates an 
enforcement action.”21 The FDA expects that “most individuals 
and firms will voluntarily comply with the law” when allowed 
an opportunity to do so before commencing enforcement 
action.22 This “arm twisting” allows the FDA to regulate 
without the expense of a full enforcement action, with reduced 
judicial oversight and limited, if any, procedural 
requirements.23 
Generally, Warning Letters are issued for violations that 
(1) are not intentional or flagrant, (2) pose little probability of 
injury or death, and (3) are not part of a history of repeated or 
continued misconduct.24 When deciding whether to issue a 
Warning Letter, the FDA looks to three factors: (1) if evidence 
shows that a firm, product or individual is in violation of the 
law or regulations; (2) violations are of regulatory significance 
and issuance of a letter is consistent with agency policy; and (3) 
“[t]here is a reasonable expectation that the responsible firm 
and persons will take prompt corrective action.”25 
After the FDA issues a Warning Letter, the receiving party 
has fifteen business days to respond and explain the corrective 
actions the party has taken or plans to take.26 Starting in 
September of 2009, the FDA instituted new procedures that 
allowed for “closing out” of Warning Letters that were followed 
by corrective action.27 If the company or individual responds 
Regulation, supra  note 8, at 27,026. 
 21. PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 13, ch. 4, at 4-1. Warning Letters 
are also issued as a way of establishing prior notice. Warning Letters 
Regulation, supra note 8, at 27,026. 
 22. PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 13, ch. 4, at 4-1. 
 23. Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of 
Congressional Delegations of Authority, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 873, 874–75 (1997). 
 24. PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 13, ch. 4, at 4-2. 
 25. Id. ch. 4, at 4-4. 
 26. Id. ch. 4, at 4-16. While fifteen working days are generally allowed for 
commencing corrective action, the Warning Letter recipient may reply with an 
explanation as to why fifteen days are inadequate and detail a time frame for 
completion of the correction. Id. 
 27. Id. ch. 4, at 4-11. “Warning Letter Close-out Letters” will be issued if: 
a. The firm replied to the Warning Letter with sufficient information 
to demonstrate that any listed violations have been adequately 
corrected; or b. A follow-up inspection shows that implementation of 
the corrective actions was adequate, or . . . FDA determines that the 
follow-up inspection is not needed; and c. The followup inspection . . . 
does not reveal other significant violations. 
Id. 
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adequately to the violations listed in the Warning Letter, a 
close-out letter will be issued and published to the FDA 
Warning Letter website, if the regulated party wishes it to be 
published.28 If a firm does not correct the violations listed in 
the Warning Letter to the FDA’s satisfaction, the FDA 
considers “further administrative and/or regulatory actions.”29 
This may include a subsequent Warning Letter.30 The FDA is 
not obligated, however, to pursue a full enforcement after 
issuing a Warning Letter nor is a Warning Letter a 
prerequisite to any enforcement action.31 The FDA maintains 
that Warning Letters constitute advisory actions that are 
“official but not final, agency action.”32 Because Warning 
Letters are not a prerequisite or commitment to enforcement 
actions, the FDA “does not consider Warning Letters to be final 
agency action on which it can be sued.”33 
Since 2005, a trend for issuing fewer Warning Letters has 
emerged.34  Totals steadily decreased from 725 in 2004 to 535 
in 2005, 538 in 2006, 471 in 2007 and 445 in 2008.35 In 2009, 
total letters issued jumped to 565 and in 2010, the FDA issued 
609 Warning Letters, a stark increase from previous years.36 
This increase followed new FDA policies that reduce oversight 
and review before a Warning Letter is issued.37 Margaret A. 
Hamburg, Commissioner of Food and Drugs, recently approved 
 28. Id. ch. 4, at 4-12. 
 29. Id. ch. 4, at 4-13. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. ch. 4, at 4-2. 
 32. Id. ch. 4, at 4-13. 
 33. Id. ch. 4, at 4-2. 
 34. ENFORCEMENT STORY, supra note 6, ch. 10, at 10-9. 
 35. See id. (showing total issued Warning Letters for 2004–2008); see also 
2009 Warning Letters, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/2009/default.h
tm (last visited Mar. 16, 2011). 
 36. 2009 Warning Letters, supra note 35; 2010 Warning Letters, U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/2010/default.h
tm (last visited May 12, 2011). The FDA Warning Letter websites contain 
several duplicates.  To obtain these figures, duplicates were removed. Data on 
file with author. 
 37. See Margaret A. Hamburg, M.D., Commissioner of Food and Drugs, 
U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Remarks at the Food and Drug Law Institute on 
“Effective Enforcement and Benefits to Public Health” (Aug. 6 2009), available 
at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Speeches/ucm175983.htm. 
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a new policy proposed by the FDA’s Chief Counsel to limit 
review of letters to “significant legal issues” in an effort to 
obtain a more “streamlined” process and increase the issuance 
speed of Warning Letters.38 
The FDA reviews all letters submitted to the FDA’s Office 
of Chief Counsel “for legal sufficiency and consistency with 
Agency policy.”39 When the Office of the Chief Counsel (OCC) 
receives the letter, it is required to “[r]eview the draft ‘final’ 
Warning Letter . . . within 15 working days.”40 The OCC must 
approve the Warning Letter before it is issued, unless it 
originates from a district office, in which case it may be 
released even if the OCC does not review the letter within the 
fifteen day time frame.41 
The FDA classifies Warning Letters as “informal 
enforcement actions,” presumably opposed to more “formal” 
enforcement actions such as seizure, injunction, or 
prosecution.42  Under 21 U.S.C. § 336, the FDA has discretion 
in what violations it chooses to pursue with a formal or 
informal enforcement action.43 Section 336 states that the 
Secretary of the FDA need not “report for prosecution . . . minor 
violations of [the FDCA] . . . [when] public interest will be 
adequately served by a suitable written notice or warning.”44  
While Warning Letters are not formal enforcement actions by 
the FDA, they pose significant problems and potential costs for 
the regulated party.45 Warning Letters expose recipients to 
litigation, public stigmatization, investment losses, and loss of 
contracting opportunities.46 Warning Letters are available 
 38. Id.; Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Commissioner Sets 
Out Vision on Enforcement to Support Public Health (Aug. 6, 2009), available 
at 
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm176119.
htm. The Commissioner of Food and Drugs is the head of the FDA, in charge 
of agency policy formation and implementation.  About the Office of the 
Commissioner, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OC/default.htm (last visited 
Jan. 27, 2011). 
 39. PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 13, ch. 4, at 4-35. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. ch. 4, at 4-34, 4-38. 
 42. See generally id. ch. 6. 
 43. 21 U.S.C. § 336 (2006) (addressing the standard for reporting and 
prosecuting minor violations of the FDCA). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Brickates Kennedy, supra note 16. 
 46. Id. 
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publicly, both at the FDA’s Freedom of Information Staff office 
and online.47 Plaintiffs’ attorneys often utilize these letters to 
seek out potential clients and build cases.48 FDA Warning 
Letters are also often cited in court cases as evidence of 
wrongdoing on the part of the defendants.49 While the FDA 
remains adamant that Warning Letters are not final agency 
action,50 the language used in Letters often is conclusory as to 
the misbranding or adulteration of various products.51 Many 
news organizations report on companies that receive Warning 
Letters, often using the Warning Letter as evidence that the 
cited product may not be safe for use.52 The publicity following 
a Warning Letter can also lead to losses in stock value and 
investment.53 The FDA also advises other governmental 
 47. Warning Letters, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/default.htm 
(last visited Oct. 20, 2010). 
 48. See, e.g., David Walk, A Warning About FDA Warning Letters, DRUG 
& DEVICE LAW (Apr. 20, 2010, 10:30 AM), 
http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2010/04/warning-about-fda-warning-
letters.html (“Lawyers for tort plaintiffs love it every time the FDA issues a 
Warning Letter. To them, FDA warnings = liability . . . .”); Yaz FDA Warning, 
supra note 16 (using a Warning Letter issued to Bayer HealthCare 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. for misleading advertising for the birth control Yaz to 
solicit new clients that have been injured and requesting they “contact our 
team of birth control attorneys . . . for a free no obligation consultation.”). 
 49. See, e.g., Avon Pension Fund v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 343 F. App’x 
671, 674 (2d Cir. 2009) (unsuccessfully attempting to introduce an FDA 
Warning Letter as evidence to meet scienter requirement). 
 50. State Enforcement Regulation, supra note 8, at 2457; Warning Letters 
Regulation, supra note 8, at 27,026. 
 51. See, e.g., Letter from Jennifer Thomas, Acting Dir., Office of 
Compliance, Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, to Dr. Ceyu Cao, 
Nature’s Health Company (Sept. 21, 2010),  available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/ucm228056.ht
m (“[T]heir labeling fails to bear adequate directions for their intended uses, 
causing them to be misbranded under section 502(f)(1) of the Act [21 U.S.C. § 
352(f)(1)].”) (alteration in original); Letter from Diana Amador-Toro, supra 
note 7 (“Listerine Total Anticavity mouthwash is not generally recognized as 
safe and effective for the antiplaque indications in its labeling, and it is, 
therefore, a new drug under 201(P) of the Act (21 U.S.C. § 321(P)).”). 
 52. See, e.g., Natasha Singer, Drug Maker Cited on Quality Issues, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 27, 2010, at B1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/27/business/27drug.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=%
22FDA%20Warning%20Letter%22&st=cse (quoting Karen Riley, FDA 
spokeswoman, that “the company continues to have serious quality control 
issues at its plant”). 
 53. See, e.g., Brickates Kennedy, supra note 16 (documenting that Boston 
Scientific’s stock prices dropped by 6% following the receipt of an FDA 
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agencies to consider the receipt of Warning Letters when 
awarding contracts.54 
B. APA ADJUDICATION AND FINALITY REQUIREMENTS 
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) serves four main 
purposes: (1) to keep the public abreast of agency rulemaking, 
procedures and organization; (2) to allow the public to 
participate in the rulemaking process; (3) “to prescribe uniform 
standards” for adjudication and rulemaking; and (4) “to restate 
the law of judicial review” of agency action.55 The APA applies 
to all federal agencies and serves as a common denominator for 
most agency action. 56 Section 553 of the APA controls agency 
rule-making while § 554 controls agency adjudication.57 
Agencies are also required to ensure procedural due process 
before depriving a regulated party of a liberty or property 
interest.58 While the APA contains no specific provisions 
governing informal agency action, courts have interpreted § 
706, which defines the scope of judicial review of agency action, 
Warning Letter). 
 54. Letter from Douglas D. Tolen, Dir., Fla. Dist., to Bill Davis, Int’l Sales 
Representative, Colloidal Products, Inc. (Dec. 19, 1996), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/199
6/UCM065164.pdf (“Other Federal Agencies are routinely advised of Warning 
Letters issued so that they may take this information into account when 
considering awards of contracts.”); Letter from Carol S. Sanchez, Acting Dist. 
Dir., New Orleans Dist., to Robert H. Ketteh, President/CEO, Crothall 
Healthcare, Inc. (Dec. 29, 2009), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/ucm197001.ht
m (“Federal agencies are advised of the issuance of all warning letters about 
devices so they may take this information into account when considering the 
award of contracts.”). 
 55. TOM C. CLARK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL 
ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 9 (1947), available at 
http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/1947cover.html. 
 56. Id. (“‘Agency’ means each authority (whether or not within or subject 
to review by another agency) of the Government of the United States other 
than Congress, the courts, or the governments of the possessions, Territories, 
or the District of Columbia.”) 
 57. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553–554 (2006). 
 58. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (“Procedural due 
process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive 
individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.”) Procedural due 
process requires that the court strike a balance between “the private interest 
that will be affected[,] . . . the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 
through the procedures used, . . . and finally, the Government’s interest, 
including . . . fiscal and administrative burdens . . . .” Id. at 321. 
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to apply to informal agency adjudications.59 
C. REVIEWABILITY OF AGENCY ACTION 
Agency actions are reviewable by a court only after certain 
criteria are met.60 As with all claims, a court can only review 
agency action “when the facts of the case have matured into an 
existing substantial controversy warranting judicial 
intervention.”61 A case is generally considered ripe for 
adjudication “if it presents a purely legal issue, or if further 
development of the facts will not render the issue more 
concrete.”62 
Ripeness, in the context of the agency action and the APA, 
is defined by the characteristics of fitness, hardship to the 
plaintiff, and finality.63 Fitness is determined by whether the 
claim “would benefit from further factual development” and 
“poses purely legal question[s] . . . not contingent on future 
possibilities.”64 The hardship requirement is met when 
“plaintiffs have . . . sustained or are immediately in danger of 
sustaining . . . direct injury as the result of the challenged 
statute or official conduct.”65 Courts also require that regulated 
parties exhaust all available agency options before resorting to 
the legal action.66 The primary purpose of the exhaustion 
doctrine is the “avoidance of premature interruption of the 
administrative process.”67 
 59. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. SEC, 873 F.2d 325, 337 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 
(citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 
(1971)). 
 60. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006). 
 61. Ripe, CORNELL UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL (Aug. 19, 2010, 5:23 PM) 
http://topics.law.cornell.edu/wex/ripe. 
 62. Id. 
 63. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193–94 (1969); Pub. Water 
Supply Dist. No. 10 v. City of Peculiar, 345 F.3d 570, 573 (8th Cir. 2003); 
Farm-to-Consumer Legal Def. Fund v. Sebelius, 734 F. Supp. 2d 668, 695 
(N.D. Iowa 2010) (citing O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974)). 
 64. Peculiar, 345 F.3d at 573. 
 65. Farm-to-Consumer, 734 F.Supp.2d at 696. 
 66. See, e.g., Cody Labs., Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 10-CV-00147-ABJ, 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80118, at *33 (D. Wyo. July 26, 2010). 
 67. McKart, 395 U.S. at 193. The court reasoned that “[t]he agency, like a 
trial court, is created for the purpose of applying a statute in the first instance. 
Accordingly, it is normally desirable to let the agency develop the necessary 
factual background upon which decisions should be based.” Id. at 193–94. The 
Court also notes that, like most judicial doctrines, several exceptions apply to 
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Section 704 of the APA states that “[a]gency action made 
reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is 
no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial 
review.”68 A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency 
action or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review 
under the final agency action rule.69 A final agency action is an 
action that represents the “‘consummation’ of the agency’s 
decision-making process” and “by which ‘rights or obligations 
have been determined,’ or from which ‘legal consequences will 
flow.’”70 Further, the finality requirement is to be applied in a 
“flexible” and “pragmatic” manner keyed to whether the 
agency’s decision has a “direct and immediate . . . effect on the 
day-to-day business” of the regulated party.71 Informal agency 
action may be interpreted as final agency action if one of four 
elements is present: 
(1) direct and immediate impact on regulated industries as a result of 
the action; (2) reliance . . . on the action; (3) agency position expressed 
in the action which represents the agency’s final, crystallized position 
on the matter in question; or (4) direct responsibility for the action in 
a high level official.72 
D. WARNING LETTERS’ FAILURE TO MEET FINALITY 
REQUIREMENTS 
Precedent has established that FDA Warning Letters do 
not constitute final agency action, and are thus not ripe for 
judicial review.73 One such recent case is Cody Labs v. Sebelius, 
the exhaustion doctrine. Id. at 193. Exceptional circumstances in which the 
exhaustion doctrine would not be applied include: (1) agency actions outside of 
statutory jurisdiction; (2) “immediate and irreparable injury to [the] person or 
property;” (3) national interest; (4) unconstitutional action coupled with 
irreparable harm; or (5) first amendment violations combined with irreparable 
harm. Robert Layton & Ralph I. Fine, The Draft and Exhaustion of 
Administrative Remedies, 56 GEO. L.J. 315, 322–28 (1967). 
 68. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006). 
 69. See McKart, 395 U.S. at 193–94. 
 70. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997) (quoting Chicago & S. Air 
Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948) and Port of 
Boston Marine Terminal Ass’n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatl., 400 U.S. 62, 71 
(1970)). 
 71. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner , 387 U.S. 136, 149–52 (1967). 
 72. 2 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law § 462 (2010). 
 73. See, e.g., Dietary Supplemental Coal., Inc. v. Sullivan, 978 F.2d 560, 
563 (9th Cir. 1992); Biotics Research Corp. v. Heckler, 710 F.2d. 1375, 1376 
(9th Cir. 1983); Cody Labs., Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 10-CV-00147-ABJ, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 80118, at *32–33 (D. Wyo. July 26, 2010); Summit Tech. v. High-
Line Med. Instruments Co., 922 F. Supp. 299, 306 (C.D. Cal. 1996). Cases 
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in which, the FDA accused Cody Labs of violating the FDCA by 
marketing a morphine sulfate solution without an approved 
new drug application.74 Cody Labs sought declaratory 
judgment, restraining order, and injunctive relief to prevent 
the FDA from requiring Cody Labs to remove their morphine 
sulphate solution from the market in a future enforcement 
action.75 The district court denied their requests.76 
The court held that the Warning Letter issued to Cody 
Labs did not constitute final agency action.77 The court cited 
Biotics Research Corp. v. Heckler for the proposition that 
“regulatory letters issued to [the plaintiffs do not] constitute a 
final decision by the FDA. The letters do contain conclusions by 
subordinate officials of the FDA that products offered by [the 
plaintiffs] are in violation of federal law . . . such letters do not 
commit the FDA to enforcement action.”78 
The court further relied on several other opinions that 
state that FDA Warning Letters do not constitute final agency 
action because the letters do not commit the FDA to take future 
regulatory action.79 Citing FTC v. Standard Oil Co., in which 
the Supreme Court held that Federal Trade Commission 
prior to 1996 refer to final agency action as related to “regulatory letters” 
rather than “Warning Letters.” The nomenclature changed in 1996, but the 
letters are functionally equivalent. See HUTT ET AL., supra note 18, at 1339. 
 74. Cody Labs, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80118, at *1; Letter from Deborah 
M. Autor, Esq., Dir., Office of Compliance, Ctr. for Drug Evaluation and 
Research, to Richard E. Asherman, CEO, Cody Labs., Inc. (Mar. 30, 2009), 
available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/ucm131695.ht
m. A new drug application, or NDA, is required for all new drugs, and are 
required to show whether the drug is safe and effective in its proposed use, if 
its benefits outweigh its risks, if the labeling meets FDA standards, and if the 
drug’s manufacturing process are adequate. New Drug Application (NDA), 
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelop
edandApproved/ApprovalApplications/NewDrugApplicationNDA/default.htm 
(last updated Aug. 20, 2010). 
 75. Cody Labs, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80118, at *2. 
 76. Id. at *54. 
 77. Id. at *32. 
 78. Id. at *33–34 (citing Biotics Research Corp. v. Heckler, 710 F.2d 1375, 
1378 (9th Cir. 1983) (second alteration in original). 
 79. Id. (citing Clinical Reference Lab., Inc. v. Sullivan, 791 F. Supp. 1499, 
1503–04 (D. Kan. 1992); Dietary Supplemental Coal. v. Sullivan, 978 F.2d 560, 
563 (9th Cir. 1992); Estee Lauder, Inc. v. FDA, 727 F. Supp. 1, 4–5 (D.D.C. 
1989); IMS Ltd. v. Califano, 453 F. Supp 157, 158–60 (C.D. Cal 1977); 
Schering Corp. v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 683, 686 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). 
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administrative complaints did not constitute final agency 
action and that response to the complaint did not constitute 
irreparable injury, the Cody Labs court analogized FDA 
Warning Letters to FTC administrative complaints to 
determine that FDA Warning Letters do not constitute 
irreparable injury or final agency action.80 
The finality of FDA Warning Letters has not always been 
so clear. In Washington Legal Foundation v. Kessler, 
Washington Legal Foundation challenged a policy of the FDA 
limiting the dissemination of information regarding “off-label” 
uses for drugs and medical devices.81 In challenging the FDA 
policy, Washington Legal Foundation alleged that through 
Warning Letters and other informal agency communications 
the FDA established an official policy banning the distribution 
of information on “off-label” uses for drugs and medical 
devices.82 The FDA argued that the Warning Letters and 
policies issued did not constitute final agency action and thus 
were not ripe for review before the court.83 The court held that 
while the Warning Letters may be advisory, it would be unwise 
to “be blind to the practical effects of these letters and other 
statements.”84 The court held that “[o]nce the agency ‘publicly 
articulates an unequivocal position . . . and expects regulated 
entities to . . . conform to that position, the agency has 
voluntarily relinquished the benefit of postponed judicial 
review.’”85 The court also noted that while regulated parties 
“may disregard [the regulatory correspondence and] go ahead 
with its planned activities . . . few if any companies are willing 
to directly challenge the FDA in this manner.”86 The court 
concluded that Washington Legal Foundation’s reduced ability 
to disseminate information about “off-label” uses is a “direct 
 80. Id. at *36–37 (citing FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232 (1980)). 
 81. Wash. Legal Found. v. Kessler, 880 F. Supp. 26, 27–28 (D.D.C. 1995).  
“Off-label” use of a drug occurs when a doctor prescribes a medication “in a 
manner different from that approved by the FDA.” Randall S. Stafford, 
Regulating Off-Label Drug Use — Rethinking the Role of the FDA, 358 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1427, 1427–29 (2008).  Off-label prescriptions are common, but 
pharmaceutical companies may not promote their products for off-label use.  
Id. 
 82. Wash. Legal Found., 880 F. Supp. at 27–30. 
 83. Id. at 34–35. 
 84. Id. at 35. 
 85. Id. (citing Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. EPA, 801 F.2d 430, 436 (D.C. Cir. 
1986)) (first omission in original). 
 86. Id. at 36. 
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and immediate effect . . . useful [in indicating] the finality of an 
agency position.”87 
A recent decision also suggests that FDA Warning Letters 
constitute final agency action. In Farm-to-Consumer Legal 
Defense Fund v. Sebelius, the court considered a motion to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.88 In Farm-to-
Consumer, the plaintiffs were individuals who purchased 
unpasteurized milk for personal consumption in states where it 
was legal to consume and then transported it to states in which 
it is illegal to consume.89 While none of the plaintiffs received 
Warning Letters, the court offered analysis in dicta of the 
interpretation of FDA Warning Letters in the context of a 
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.90 The 
court in Farm-to-Consumer disagreed with the decision in 
Biotics Research Corp. v. Heckler, in that it required an 
imminent injury to meet the hardship and ripeness 
requirements.91  The court reasoned that “[s]uch a rule would 
mean that no pre-enforcement challenge to agency regulations 
is ever ripe . . . . The ‘hardship’ prong of the ‘ripeness’ analysis 
does not require the plaintiff to wait until the threatened injury 
occurs.”92 
The court emphasized the importance of the availability of 
pre-enforcement action further by asserting that while judicial 
review may be limited in the “preliminary phases of 
administrative procedures to enforce regulations”93 pre-
enforcement declaratory judgments have not be eliminated 
outright.94 
 
 87. Id. (citing Ciba-Geigy Corp., 801 F.2d at 436). 
 88. Farm-to-Consumer Legal Def. Fund v. Sebelius, 734 F.Supp.2d 668, 
675 (N.D. Iowa 2010). 
 89. Id. at 674–75. 
 90. Id. at 685. 
 91. Id. at 696 (discussing Biotics Research Corp. v. Heckler, 710 F.2d 1375 
(9th Cir. 1983)). 
 92. Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Pub. Water Supply Dist. No. 10 v. 
City of Peculiar, 345 F.3d 570, 573 (8th Cir. 2003)). 
 93. Id. at 698. 
 94. Id. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. COMPARING CODY LABS WITH WASHINGTON LEGAL 
FOUNDATION 
The courts in Cody Labs and Washington Legal Foundation 
approached the question of finality in two distinct ways. Cody 
Labs is an opinion typical of recent decisions addressing the 
finality of FDA Warning Letters.95 It is typical in the sense 
that it relies on two assumptions: (1) that previous analysis of 
FDA Warning Letters has been proper, and (2) that the lack of 
formal enforcement action by the FDA equates to a lack of 
finality.96 Like courts before it, the court in Cody Labs decided 
that Warning Letters were not sufficiently “final” because the 
letter does not bind the FDA to a formal enforcement action.97 
Washington Legal Foundation, however, took a different 
course. While the court recognized that Warning Letters 
themselves were not a full enforcement action, the policies and 
determinations within them did in fact constitute a final 
decision on the legality of the cited actions and amount to an 
action final enough to be challenged before the court.98 
In taking this stance, the Washington Legal Foundation 
court recognized the effect of FDA Warning Letters on 
regulated parties.99 Like many other agencies, the FDA relies 
upon “arm twisting” to obtain compliance without the expense 
of a formal enforcement action.100 For this policy to be effective 
however, an adequate number of regulated parties must act 
willingly, or at least under coercion, to meet the agency’s 
demand.101 To ensure compliance, the “arm twisting” must be 
significant, the demands must be real, and threat of 
 95. See, e.g., Cody Labs., Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 10-CV-00147-ABJ, 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80118, at *27–29 (D. Wyo. July 26, 2010); Clinical Reference 
Lab., Inc. v. Sullivan, 791 F. Supp. 1499, 1504 (D. Kan. 1992); Den-Mat Corp. 
v. United States, No. MJG-92-444, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12233, at *12–13 (D. 
Md. Aug. 17, 1992). 
 96. Cody Labs, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80118, at *27–29. 
 97. Id. at *34 (citing Clinical Reference Lab, 791 F. Supp. at 1503–04). 
 98. Wash. Legal Found. v. Kessler, 880 F. Supp. 26, 34 (D.D.C. 1995) (“In 
the context of a ripeness inquiry, it is the effect of the agency’s conduct which 
is most important in determining whether an agency has adopted a final 
policy.”). 
 99. See id. at 35. 
 100. See id. at 34–35; Noah, supra note 23 at 874–75. 
 101. See Warning Letters Regulation, supra note 8, at 27,026. 
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enforcement cannot be illusory or a far flung possibility.102 
FDA Warning Letters accomplish these goals by determining in 
precise legal language the ways in which the FDA deems the 
regulated parties have violated the law and demands that they 
must comply or face further consequences.103 As a result, many 
regulated parties have no real choice but to comply in order to 
avoid further cost and inconvenience.104 In this way, as the 
court in Washington Legal Foundation recognized, Warning 
Letters have the effect of demanding compliance and the 
“practical effect” is that of a formal enforcement action.105 
Cody Labs, and other cases like it, seem unconvinced or 
unconcerned about the practical effect of the Warning Letter on 
regulated parties when determining their finality.106 Much of 
the discussion in these cases revolves around the fact that the 
Letters impose no formal legal requirements upon the FDA or 
the regulated party.107 These courts reasoned that the FDA’s 
position is “tentative,” and that courts should not interfere with 
“an ongoing agency proceeding.”108 This declaration seemingly 
equates FDA Warning Letters as a step in a process ultimately 
leading to formal agency action, rather than an agency 
proceeding in and of itself that determines obligations and 
crystallizes an agency’s position on a matter.109 
B. BENNETT V. SPEAR STANDARDS: CONSUMMATION AND 
OBLIGATION 
In Bennett v. Spear, the United States Supreme Court 
summarized the finality standard in two prongs. First, the 
agency action must mark the “consummation of the agency’s 
 102. See Noah, supra note 23 at 876 (“[A]dministrative agencies have 
numerous opportunities to pursue indirectly ends that they could not impose 
directly. Arm-twisting may occur during licensing, governmental contracting, 
and enforcement proceedings.”). 
 103. See Letter from Joann M. Givens, supra note 1. 
 104. See Noah, supra note 23, at 874–75. 
 105. See Washington Legal Foundation, 880 F. Supp. at 35–36. 
 106. See generally Cody Labs., Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 10-CV-00147-ABJ, 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80118 (D. Wyo. July 26, 2010) (failing to address the 
practical consequences of Warning Letters in its analysis). 
 107. Id. at *34 (citing Clinical Reference Lab., Inc. v. Sullivan, 791 F. Supp. 
1499, 1503–04 (D. Kan. 1992)). 
 108. Estee Lauder, Inc. v. FDA, 727 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1989). 
 109. See Cody Labs, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80118, at *34. 
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decision-making process.”110 Second, the agency action must 
determine “rights or obligations” for the regulated party “from 
which legal consequences will flow.”111 These standards of 
consummation and obligation, when applied to a challenge to 
an FDA Warning Letter, illustrate that these letters can and 
should be interpreted to be final agency action. 
1. Consummation 
In order for an agency action to be final and reviewable 
under § 704 of the APA, the challenged agency action must be 
the end, or consummation, of the agency’s decision-making 
process.112 In doing so, the test requires that a court not “step 
into the [agency’s] role as a formulator of . . . policy” and 
prevents premature review of agency decisions that may not 
yet be the complete or end opinion of the agency.113 The 
consummation requirement is relevant in interpreting Warning 
Letters in the context of the FDA’s larger formal enforcement 
action scheme. 
While most courts seemingly regard a Warning Letter as a 
mere interlocutory step in a formal enforcement action, a 
Warning Letter is better characterized as an independent 
agency action.114 FDA policy neither requires a Warning Letter 
to be issued before a formal enforcement action nor binds the 
agency to commencing a formal enforcement action.115 Even 
further, 21 U.S.C. § 336 states that minor violations of the 
FDCA can be fully addressed by written notice or warning 
where appropriate.116 Because a Warning Letter is neither 
required, nor always used, prior to a formal enforcement action, 
it is not a prerequisite to a formal enforcement action.117 Thus, 
Warning Letters are not a necessary step leading to a formal 
enforcement action.  Rather, Warning Letters are final action 
undertaken by the agency to induce compliance.118 Indeed, in 
 110. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 111. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Port of Bos. Marine 
Terminal Ass’n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatl., 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970)). 
 112. See id. at 177–78; 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006). 
 113. Wash. Legal Found. v. Kessler, 880 F. Supp. 26, 32 (D.D.C. 1995). 
 114. See PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 13, ch. 4, at 4-2. 
 115. See id. 
 116. 21 U.S.C. § 336 (2006). 
 117. See id. 
 118. Contra PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 13, ch. 4, at 4-13 (discussing 
the policy for issuing a second warning letter to the same entity). 
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passing 21 U.S.C. § 336, Congress passed legislation that by its 
own language makes a written notice or warning an action 
sufficient for enforcement against certain violations.119 Courts 
that reason Warning Letters only seek to “enjoin a possible 
future FDA enforcement action” fail to recognize the operation 
of Warning Letters in the FDA’s overall enforcement scheme.120 
Just as a prosecutor can assert her discretion by choosing 
whom she chooses to prosecute, the FDA also has discretion to 
proceed to formal enforcement actions without issuing a 
Warning Letter at all.121 While Warning Letters are not the 
“consummation” of the FDA’s formal enforcement action, they 
are the consummation of the decision to enact informal 
enforcement against a regulated party.122 To characterize a 
Warning Letter as a tentative action is to mischaracterize its 
relationship to formal enforcement actions. 
2. Obligation 
The obligation requirement of the Bennett v. Spear test 
requires a final agency action to determine “rights or 
obligations” of the regulated party and “legal consequences 
[must] flow” from the agency’s determination.123 In 
determining the obligation that an agency action has upon a 
regulated party, the Supreme Court has looked to the language 
used by agencies.124 In Bell v. New Jersey, the Court concluded 
that the Department of Education established deficiencies 
owed, the language used in establishing the deficiency, was 
sufficiently “definitive” to render the order final as defined by § 
704 of the APA.125 In doing so, the Court adopted the “flexible” 
 119. See 21 U.S.C. § 336. 
 120. Cody Labs., Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 10-CV-00147-ABJ, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 80118, at *11 (D. Wyo. July 26, 2010); PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra 
note 13, ch. 4, at 4-2. 
 121. 21 U.S.C. § 336. 
 122. C.f., Gordon v. Norton, 322 F.3d 1213, 1220 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding 
that an action is not final because the agency was clear that it had not yet 
interpreted applicable rules and was still engaged in its decision-making 
process); RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 1320 (5th 
ed. 2010). 
 123. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997) (quoting Port of Bos. 
Marine Terminal Ass’n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatl., 400 U.S. 62, 71 
(1970)). 
 124. Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 779 n.4 (1983). 
 125. Id. 
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and “pragmatic” requirements of Abbott Labs v. Secretary of 
Health, Education and Welfare.126 
From a formalistic perspective, an FDA Warning Letter 
imposes no binding legal obligations on the recipient.127 Parties 
are able to disregard the directives contained in a Warning 
Letter and challenge “any adverse FDA action in [a formal] 
enforcement hearing.”128 By ignoring Warning Letters, 
regulated parties risk “arous[ing] the ire of such a powerful 
agency [as the FDA],” in addition to the related hardships that 
accompany the receipt of a Warning Letter.129 However, 
significant and consequential, if not legal, obligations are put 
upon those regulated parties that receive Warning Letters.130 
Beyond risking the ire of the FDA, regulated parties are 
vulnerable to lawsuits, loss of sales and investments, and 
sacrifice of contracting opportunities with the federal 
government.131 
Another risk in receiving an FDA Warning Letter is the 
potential loss of government contracting opportunities. This is 
especially damaging to pharmaceutical companies and other 
health-related manufacturers. As of 2009, slightly more than 
30% of the United States population received federally-funded 
health insurance.132 The percentage of Americans covered by, 
 126. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); see also Bell, 461 U.S. at 
779–80 (“Our cases have interpreted pragmatically the requirement of 
administrative finality . . . .”). 
 127. See, e.g., Wash. Legal Found. v. Kessler, 880 F. Supp. 26, 35 (D.D.C. 
1995). Other courts have found, however, that where an agency issues a letter 
determining legally defined questions, that letter can constitute final agency 
action. W. Illinois Home Health Care, Inc. v. Herman, 150 F.3d 659, 663 (7th 
Cir. 1998) (holding that a letter sent by an Assistant Agency District Director 
was final and reviewable because it interpreted the meaning of the term “joint 
employer” as defined in the Fair Labor Standards Act); PIERCE, supra note 
134, at 1330. 
 128. Washington Legal Foundation, 880 F. Supp. at 36. In reality, 
approximately 93% of those who receive Warning Letters respond to the FDA. 
State Enforcement Regulation, supra note 8, at 2457. 
 129. Washington Legal Foundation, 880 F. Supp. at 36. 
 130. Even the FDA notes that Warning Letters are not to be taken lightly 
and expect that a majority of parties will in fact take corrective action upon 
receipt. Warning Letters Regulation, supra note 8, at 27,026. 
 131. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 132. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE 
COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2009, at 25 (2010), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/p60-238.pdf. Government health plans 
include Medicare, Medicaid, military healthcare, and plans provided to federal 
employees. Id. 
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and thus receiving their medications from, government sources 
(i.e., Medicare) is even higher for the over-sixty five population. 
More than 75% of Americans age sixty five and older receive 
their health coverage from the federal government, and thus 
have their prescriptions and covered health-related products 
paid for by the government.133 Threats by the FDA to inform 
other government agencies, such as Medicaid and Medicare, of 
the presence of an outstanding Warning Letter present a real 
risk to those pharmaceutical companies that consistently 
contract with the government for the sale of their products to 
Medicare and Medicaid patients.134 While a Warning Letter is 
only a threat of government action, that threat may be 
impossible to ignore for companies dependent on Medicare and 
Medicaid sales. 
C. EXHAUSTION 
The issue of exhaustion is frequently raised in cases 
addressing the finality of FDA Warning Letters. The 
exhaustion doctrine, primarily a judge-made concept, states 
that a regulated party must utilize “all possible agency 
procedures . . . or levels of decision making” before an agency 
determination can be subject to judicial review.135 The 
exhaustion doctrine “prevent[s] an overworked court from 
considering issues and remedies that [are] available through 
administrative channels.”136 It also promotes “accuracy, 
efficiency, agency autonomy, and judicial economy.”137 Courts 
have exercised discretion in applying the exhaustion doctrine, 
declining to enforce the requirement “where a plaintiff would 
be irreparably harmed by delay, where the agency lacks the 
power to grant effective relief, or where exhaustion would be 
futile.”138 Exhaustion is considered futile “when there is a 
 133. Elizabeth Mendes, Nearly 30% of Insured Have Government Plans, Up 
from ‘08, GALLUP (July 30, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/121970/nearly-
insured-government-coverage-2008.aspx. 
 134. This is due to the importance of reputation to repeat players. Jason 
Scott Johnston & Joel Waldfogel, Does Repeat Play Elicit Cooperation? 
Evidence from Federal and Civil Litigation, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 39, 39–40 
(2002). 
 135. WILLIAM F. FOX, UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 282 (5th ed. 
2008). 
 136. 2 AM. JUR. 2d Administrative Law § 474 (2010). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Farm-to-Consumer Legal Def. Fund v. Sebelius, 734 F.Supp.2d 668, 
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certainty of an adverse decision, or when the agency ‘has 
evidenced a strong position on the issue together with an 
unwillingness to reconsider.’”139 Parties cannot circumvent the 
exhaustion requirement simply by asserting “[u]nsupported 
and speculative claims of futility.”140 When regulated parties 
raise a substantial constitutional question, however, the 
exhaustion requirement may be excused.141 
Regulated parties often confront the issue of exhaustion 
when challenging FDA Warning Letters. While no formal 
structure exists to challenge a Warning Letter, the FDA has 
often asserted that regulated parties have not exhausted the 
available remedies by failing to file a citizen petition.142 A 
citizen petition is a procedure followed by the FDA in which 
any citizen can submit a request for the agency to issue, 
amend, or revoke any regulation or order or refrain from taking 
action.143 After the petition is submitted, the FDA generally 
has 180 days to reply with a direct answer to the proposal or a 
response that further time is needed.144 Failure to reply within 
the 180-day period constitutes final agency action.145 
Many courts have held that even if Warning Letters were 
final, regulated parties had not met the requirement of 
exhaustion because they had not filed a citizen petition asking 
700 (N.D. Iowa 2010) (citing McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 146–49 
(1992)). 
 139. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 140. Chorosevic v. MetLife Choices, 600 F.3d 934, 945 (8th Cir. 2010) 
(quoting Midgett v. Wash. Grp. Int’l Long Term Disability Plan, 561 F.3d 887, 
898 (8th Cir. 2009)). See also KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 759 (2010) (“[C]ourts typically apply the 
futility exception only when the petitioner can ‘provide a clear and positive 
showing’ that exhaustion would be an exercise in futility.”). 
 141. 2 AM. JUR. 2d Administrative Law § 478 (2010). 
 142. E.g., Cody Labs., Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 10-CV-00147-ABJ, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 80118, at *33 (D. Wyo. July 26, 2010) (“[P]laintiffs could can [sic] 
file a citizen petition at any time seeking FDA’s views . . . . Plaintiffs failed to 
exhaust this much-utilized procedure under which they could have obtained 
FDA’s view on an administrative record.”) 
 143. 21 C.F.R. § 10.30 (2010). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Gerald F. Masoudi, Legal Developments in the Enforcement of Food 
and Drug Law, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 585, 588 (2008). Interestingly, while the 
Code of Federal Regulations does not specify that the 180-day expiration 
constitutes final agency action, Chief Counsel at the Food and Drug 
Administration, Gerald F. Masoudi stated at the 51st FDLI Annual 
Conference that failure to respond within the 180-day time frame in fact 
constituted final agency action. Id. 
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the FDA to recant the legal position taken in the received 
Warning Letter.146 While a regulated party could submit a 
citizen petition and wait the requisite 180 days, the availability 
of this option does not necessarily thwart the justiciability of all 
Warning Letters. 
Most clearly, those regulated parties asserting 
constitutional claims could likely avoid the exhaustion 
doctrine’s implication of a citizen petition. Parties that raise 
constitutional questions that cannot be adequately examined 
by the administrative agency are generally excused from the 
exhaustion requirement, and thus would likely be excused from 
filing a citizen petition.147 Regulated parties that do not assert 
constitutional claims may also be able to avoid the citizen 
petition process.  Regulated parties may argue that the 
additional procedural hurdle of filing a citizen petition may be 
futile, given the clear agency position announced in the 
Warning Letter. Exhaustion is futile when an agency 
pronounces a clear position and an adverse outcome is likely. 
The FDA crafts Warning Letters to coerce compliance, with 
high specificity and a low possibility for reconsideration of the 
issue.148 A citizen petition to exhaust agency remedies under 
these conditions would indeed be futile because the likelihood 
of reconsideration of the issue is so low as to make the process 
without benefit for either the regulated party or the FDA. 
D. FDA WARNING LETTERS NEED LIMITED REVIEWABILITY 
Several legal analyses support the view that FDA Warning 
Letters should meet the finality standard. This conclusion flows 
from the fact that a Warning Letter constitutes the 
consummation of the FDA’s informal enforcement action and 
real obligations are placed upon regulated parties, satisfying 
 146. Cody Labs, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80118, at *30–33. 
 147. One area of the law in which the FDA is seeing increasing number of 
constitutional claims is in relation to labeling and first amendment speech 
rights. See generally Ralph F. Hall & Elizabeth S. Sobotka, Inconsistent 
Government Policies: Why FDA Off-Label Regulation Cannot Survive First 
Amendment Review Under Greater New Orleans, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1 
(2007). A party claiming that its first amendment rights were being violated 
by not being able to advertise or label in a certain manner would be an 
example of a constitutional claim that could not be adequately addressed 
through a citizen petition, and thus would likely not be subject to the 
exhaustion requirement. See 2 AM. JUR. 2d Administrative Law § 478 (2010). 
 148. See PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 13, ch. 4, at 4-1. 
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the requirements outlined in Bennett v. Spear.149 Furthermore, 
while not all Warning Letters may be reviewable due to the 
exhaustion requirement, many should be excused from that 
requirement by either asserting constitutional claims or that 
utilizing more agency procedure would be futile. 
Warning Letters need to be reviewable for pragmatic and 
policy reasons. As a practical matter, Warning Letters have the 
power to seriously harm companies and researchers, causing 
drops in investment and purchasing, exposing these companies 
to liability in lawsuits, and potentially causing products to be 
withdrawn from the market, all with no practical recourse for 
those regulated parties.150 While the FDA Warning Letters 
serve admirable purposes and undoubtedly bring offending 
parties into compliance at a minimal expense, the process is 
subject to mistakes and abuse. Even though the FDA achieves 
an incredible amount of regulation on a relatively limited 
budget and indeed many of their determinations in Warning 
Letters are likely accurate and sound, our judicial system rests 
on nothing if not the idea that parties are entitled to the 
opportunity to have their legal rights adjudicated before a 
court. By not characterizing Warning Letters as final, courts 
allow regulation without any of the procedural accoutrement 
that would normally accompany such an action if the agency 
proceeded in an official manner, such as notice and comment 
opportunities, oral or paper hearings, or judicial challenge. 
Failure to allow review of Warning Letters and similar agency 
actions could lead to agencies “effectively regulat[ing] industry 
without ever exposing [themselves] to judicial review,” a result 
that must be avoided to ensure regulatory justice.151 
III. CONCLUSION 
While sympathies may run low for the makers of “black-out 
in-a-can”, other companies and researchers that produce life-
saving drugs and devices also receive Warning Letters from the 
FDA. Courts have given the FDA an incredible amount of 
power to coerce compliance by regulated parties who may have 
legitimate concerns about the legal conclusions contained in the 
Warning Letters they receive. Failure to allow review also 
leaves these regulated parties open to significant consequences, 
 149. See supra Part III.B. 
 150. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 151. Wash. Legal Found. v. Kessler, 880 F. Supp. 26, 34 (D.D.C. 1995). 
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such as loss of market share and investment as well as the risk 
of an onslaught of litigation costs.152 Limited review of some 
Warning Letters can serve as a modest check on an agency that 
controls upwards of 25% of the United States’ economy.153 
Beyond policy concerns, however, the legal standards of 
finality stand behind the idea that Warning Letters, when 
sufficiently exhaustive, should be allowed review. While much 
case law on the subject exists, and most determines that 
Warning Letters are not justiciable, this case law rests on a 
fundamental misunderstanding of Warning Letters in the 
context of FDA enforcement actions. Precedent is rightly 
respected and followed; however, when precedent rests of false 
assumptions, it is improper to follow it blindly for its own 
sake.154 When the Bennett v. Spear finality tests of 
consummation and obligation are applied to Warning Letters, it 
becomes clear that the precedent in this area has been 
incorrect, theoretically and factually. Warning Letters should 
be justiciable final agency action because they pass the 
requirements of Bennett v. Spear and represent a potentially 
crippling harm to products and companies regulated by the 
FDA. 
 
 152. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 153. Lisa Richwine, FDA Chief Urges Caution on Budget Cut, REUTERS 
(Nov. 9, 2010, 5:39 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6A84QI20101109. 
 154. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. 
REV. 457, 469 (1897), available at 
http://www.constitution.org/lrev/owh/path_law.htm  (“[History] is part of the 
rational study [of law], because it is the first step toward an enlightened 
s[k]epticism, that is, toward a deliberate reconsideration of the worth of those 
rules.”) 
